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I am very happy to be accorded the privilege of addressing 
the Washington Post of the American Ordnance Association on 
this occasion. I have for many years followed AOA activities 
and know of your concern for and your efforts on behalf of the 
security of the United States -- not only in the special line 
of military defense, but also in the broader context of education, 
the economic well-being of the country, and international affairs. 
At Christmas time, particularly, the well-being, of all man-
kind seems to be the concern of all. In government operations, 
it is also a period of introspection and re-examination of 
policies and programs brought on by impending Congressional 
hearings aimed at determining in detail what our national activi-
ties should be in the new year. Accordingly, I propose to 
re-examine briefly the national activities in space as I see 
them, not--only in the past and the present, but also as they 
reflect an image of the future. 
It is obvious that the last decade has produced dramatic 
changes in our national viewpoints on the question of the
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exploration of space. I would like to refer back, as a starting 
point, to a series of tests which were performed in 1949 under 
the sponsorship of the Army Ordnance Department under the code 
name, "Bumper." This project was carried out jointly by the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the General Electric Company, and 
the Douglas Aircraft Company. The object of the project was to 
launch a Wac Corporal upper-stage vehicle from a V-2, and demon-
strate a prototype high-performance, multi-stage rocket vehicle 
system. As you may recall, the project was entirely successful 
in demonstrating the feasibility of several unproved concepts: 
the staging of rocket vehicles at high altitudes, the utility 
of ablative materials for protection from aerodynamic heating, 
and a method of stabilizing rocket propelled vehicles operating 
in the vacuum of space. One of the most significant interpreta-
tions of this test to the engineers familiar with the work was	
1 
the fact that the test showed that there were no longer any 
purely scientific barriers to the construction of vehicles 
capable of space flight. The barrier was engineering. 
In the general atmosphere prevailing at that time, this 
most significant result could not be announced from the house 
tops. Indeed, public discussion of space activities was con-
sidered at that time to be in rather poor taste. It was only 
within the privacy of some scientific and engineering institu-
tions, such as Rand or the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, that the 
significance of space was dimly recognized. I say"dimly," even 
though JPL, working for the Navy, and Rand; for the Air Force, 
had already made studies of satellite problems.
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Within the United States the first definite step toward 
the active exploration of space occurred in the summer of 1955 
when the President announced that we would, as part of our 
participation in the International Geophysical Year activity, 
attempt to launch at least one scientifically instrumented 
satellite into an orbit around the earth during the 1957-1958 
period. In our planning to carry out this commitment we 
decided to do the work on the smallest significant scale, more 
as a demonstration of the feasibility of space activities than 
as a real beginning of the exploration of space. 
The next critical step in inaugurating a national program 
for the exploration of space came three years later with the 
passage of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. The 
Act established the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion and, as a matter of national policy, directed NASA to 
"plan, direct, and conduct" such "activities as may be required 
for the exploration of space." It is this instruction to carry 
out the exploration of space which is the unique feature of the 
charter of NASA, and it is this responsibility which requires 
NASA to make significant contributions over the long term to 
the security of the nation -- in a new way. 
The long-term security of our country requires that we 
retain the climate of intellectual vigor and vitality, which 
in the past has been such an important element of our national 
strength -- a factor that has produced and has attracted the
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best efforts of mankind everywhere. The dimly felt but 
undeniably important long-term results of the exploration of 
space must be expected to affect strongly the intellectual life 
of all mankind, and we in the United States must play a respon
-
sible role in exploring this new frontier for the benefit of 
humanity. 
We have by now carried out a number of experiments which 
have clearly demonstrated the feasibility of operations in 
space. Our scientific results from these experiments have con-
vinced us that space is an intellectually fruitful environment 
1 for scientific experiment. For example, Explorer I, whose 
successful launching in January 1958 formally fulfilled our 
national commitment to the IGY, demonstrated that our under-
standing of the outer reaches of the earth's atmosphere was far 
from correct. As a consequence, many of our later flights have 
been instrumented to explore in greater detail the great radia-
tion belts surrounding the Earth. We have also taken our first 
step beyond the gravitational field of the Earth with our 
Pioneer IV space probe, launched last March and now in orbit 
about the sun. 
While we have had many successes and have produced much 
significant scientific information, our activities have not 
been fully satisfying because our scale of activity is small 
and limited in comparison with that of our only competitor, the 
USSR. The Soviet space exploration program, presumably, was 
formally organized in 1954 when their Interdepartmental
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Commission for Interplan.&tary Communication was established --
four years before NASA was. created. It is now evident that their 
initial planning called for an aggressive space program so that 
highly significant exploratory experiments could be boosted into 
space. In effect, they bypassed completely the small-scale 
feasibility demonstration -- the Vanguard phase -- which was 
our initial step. 
At the present time our program for the exploration of space 
has two principal features: (1) using interim capabilities 
created on a short-term basis for the limited uses they permit, 
(2) preparation of more versatile and powerful equipments to 
carry us into a sound program for the long haul. Both of these 
activities are essential. For example, if we were to refrain 
from using the interim vehicles and only concentrate our entire 
effort on long-term preparation for the future, not only would 
our position in the international arena be more greatly 
jeopardized, but, technically, we would have probably missed 
some of the scientific factors which may well be of great 
significance in guiding the course of our future activities. 
On the other hand, if we were to concentrate our entire attention 
on the exploitation of our present limited capacities with no 
effort spent on preparing more efficient and more capable 
equipment for the future, we would be placed in an even less 
defensible position. Maintaining a proper balance between 
these two activities Is consequently one of our most serious 
problems.
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In order to serve our interim needs for space vehicles, we 
are using the upper-stage rockets developed under the Vanguard 
and Jupiter C programs. Thus our initial venture into space 
is dependent on these smaller rockets and the, larger IRBM 
booster rockets developed as part of our military effort. For 
example, we have combined the spinning cluster of solid propel-
lant rockets used on Explorer 'I with the Jupiter IRBM to create 
what we now call the Juno II vehicle. The upper stages of the 
Vanguard have been combined with the Thor IRBM to create the 
Thor-Able and the Thor-Delta vehicles. 
.- --
The largest _scientific payloads we have up to this date 
placed in orbit are the 90-pound Explorer VII payload, launched 
--
by a Juno II, and the 142-pound Explorer VI payload launched by 
a Thor-Able. Somewhat larger iayloads have been launched in 
the Discoverer series; however, these somewhat larger payloads 
are possible only in very low-perigee, short-lived orbits which 
-	 - - 
are not well suited for most space science experiments. 
One way to compare the effectiveness of these interim con-
figurations with more appropriately designed equipment is to 
note the ratio of takeoff weight to payload weight. For the 
142-pound Explorer VI, the ratio is about 70 to 1. A properly 
proportioned three-stage vehicle using our current level of 
technology, the same as that used in any of our large military 
vehicles, would have takeoff weight to payload weight ratio of 
40 or 50 to 1; that is, our present exploitation of the booster
-	 Page  
vehicle in satellite orbits is less than 10% effective. Simi-
larly, - the Pioneer IV had a net payload weight of only 12 pounds 
for a ratio of about 8000 to 1. Again, a properly proportioned 
vehicle would produce a ratio of about 150 or 200 to 1, and our 
efficiency of exploitation, in this case, is thus less than 3%. 
These ratios show clearly that our present operations are 
not primarily limited by the size of our first-stage booster 
rockets -- even though in the long run we require substantially 
larger booster rockets. Our present primary limitation lies 
in the fact that we do not have the appropriately scaled upper-
stage rockets to exploit efficiently our large military booster 
rockets as first-stage launching vehicles. 
We are now developing the Agena and the Centaur upper-stage 
- - 
rockets to permit an efficient exploitation of our IRBM and ICBM 
boosters. For comparison it may be of interest to note that the 
high-energy propellant development used in Centaur Is expected to 
produce a payload capacity in an orbit corresponding to a ratio 
of takeoff weight to payload weight of about 30 to 1, twenty-
five times as effective an exploitation as our best effort to 
date.
We are also proceeding with the development of the Saturn 
-	 --	 -	 -	 - 
booster which is roughly four times the size of ti-e Atlas ICBM. 
Part of the Saturn project envisions the use of upper-stage 
rockets to exploit efficiently this very large booster capacity. 
Still longer-term and higher-performance vehicles are required 
for later space exploration missions. A first step toward
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satisfying this future requirement is the development of a 
one-and-a-half million pound thrust single chamber rocket 
engine which can be clustered to power the very large vehicles 
which we foresee for the future. 
Until we have the upper-stage developments to permit us 
to use our present booster capacity effectively we will not be 
able to carry out the more significant space exploration 
missions which require precision guidance and substantial pay-
loads. It is also quite apparent that until these new equip-
ments are available the cost per pound of payload in orbit will 
be inordinately high. It is necessary for us to go to great 
lengths in miniaturization of equipment in order to maximize 
the effectiveness of our overall operation. 
Even with these limitations we expect our flight program 
in this interim period, which will cover all of the next year, 
to produce significant and important results. We will continue 
our exploration of the nature of the great radiation belt and 
of the ultraviolet and gamma radiation outside the Earth's 
atmosphere. We expect to make further measurements of the 
infrared radiation characteristics of the Earth and related 
measurements of significance to the meteorological forecasting 
problem. We expect to make some communications experiments 
using a large 100-foot sphere as a passive reflector for radio 
transmissions. We also expect to be well down the road on the 
final phases of preparation for Project Mercury. The capsule
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check-out should be nearly completed and the Astronauts should 
have entered the most advanced phase of their training with 
the suborbital Redstone flights. It is perhaps of interest at 
this point to note that Project Mercury requires only a rela- 
tively low-per±gee, short-lived orbit. Consequently, we do not 
have to wait for the development of more capable equipment; the 
standard Atlas vehicle is capable of producing the required 
performance. 
In summary, we are carrying out a flight program which has 
yielded, and will continue to yield, interesting and significant 
results, even though we ar still severely limited by the 
interim nature of our flight vehicles. We have underway the new 
vehicle developments which we expect will increase greatly our 
efficiency of operation and our capability to operate in space. 
The rate at Which we will progress into the exploration of space 
is of course dependent upon the resources which are placed at 
our disposal; however, I can assure you that we at NASA are 
making every effort to make certain that these resources are 
efficiently used so as to produce the most effective over-all 
program. 
Thank you and Seasons Greetings! 
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